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UN climate change talks EU must push for UN deal to avoid dangerous climate change say MEPs

The European Parliament today adopted a resolution, setting out its position on the UN climate change negotiations ahead of the forthcoming UN climate summit in Paris (COP21). Commenting after the vote, Green MEP Benedek Javor said:

“The European Parliament has today underlined the need for the EU to push for a binding UN climate deal that aims to avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to below 2 degrees.

“Beyond the general goals in today’s resolution, it is clear that the EU will need to seriously up its ambition if it is to play a constructive and proactive role in shaping the UN talks to this end. As Greens, we are concerned that the EU risks being a bystander at COP21 if it does not up its game.

“The EU’s 2030 climate change targets are acknowledged to be low on ambition. The headline figure of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 40% is already far below what is necessary, both to limit global warming to 2 degrees and to spur the green economy. A positive signal from the EU that it is willing to increase this ambition depending on an agreement at the COP21 would provide some momentum and impetus for the Paris talks.

“Long-term emissions goals will be a key issue at the COP21. We need to be phasing out carbon globally by 2050 and moving to zero emissions to prevent dangerous climate change. The EU should join the other countries calling for this in the UN negotiations. Simply aligning the EU’s position with that of the G7 (a global reduction of emissions between 40-70% by 2050) is out of sync with the EU’s goal of limiting the global increase in temperature to below 2°C. 

“Finance for assisting developing countries most affected by climate change will be a crucial factor in agreement at the COP21. If the EU is to try and positively influence the outcome, we need to both deliver on commitments up to 2020 but also commit to fair and predictable scale of public climate aid beyond 2020.

“It is important that any climate change agreement is binding and its implementation will not be subject to challenge by corporations in private tribunals. We welcome support from MEPs for a Green amendment to this end today.”

ITCO intergroup pressures the European Parliament to ban salaried side jobs

The intergroup on Integrity, Transparency, Corruption and Organised crime calls for a revision of the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament, in order to ban side jobs for MEPs. Under the current rules, MEPs can have various paid side jobs. The Volkswagen emission scandal, about which a debate in the European Parliament was held yesterday, illustrates that it is exactly the close bonds between the automobile industry and the European institutions that has enabled the widespread fraud with emissions.

The emission fraud scandal in the automobile industry should trigger a sharper focus on the tight relation between the car-industry and European institutions. So far, MEPs have been allowed to have side jobs, as long as they register these through their declarations of interest.

The code of conduct has a provision on conflicts of interest, which are defined as follows: a conflict of interest arises when a Member of the European Parliament has a personal interest that could improperly influence the performance of his or her duties as a Member. The Code of Conduct obliges members to disclose any actual or potential conflict of interest before speaking/voting in the plenary or when proposed as a rapporteur. Apart from that, MEPs can have as many side jobs as they want. This leads to the current situation that some MEP’s are involved in the car-industry. Currently the EP is revising its internal rules and, therefore, the ITCO intergroup proposes to ban paid salaried side jobs as soon as possible.

Dennis de Jong states in his capacity as co-chair of the intergroup: ”There is an urgent need to end the ties between the industry and members of the EP. We should start by implementing a ban on paid side jobs. This is the best possible guarantee against conflicts of interest arising”. Benedek Jávor as vice-chair of the intergroup highlights that: “Without transparent rules concerning the functioning of MEP-industry forums and a ban on paid side jobs for MEPs, European legislation will continue to be governed by industry priorities, even at the expense of the health of European citizens.”

New interim storage needed for Paks2?

Earlier this year the Hungarian government negotiated and signed a modified contract with the Russians that most likely does not include points about the guarantee of reprocessing spent fuel elements in Russia, following the decrease of exclusive supply to 10 years. This was needed after the Commission’s refusal to countersign (under EURATOM) the contract guaranteeing 20 years of fuel supply exclusivity from December 2014.

Together with my Finnish colleague Heidi Hautla, we had requested information from the Commission about the reasons for their decisions on the fuel supply contracts of both Paks2 and Fennovoima; the Commission promised to publish the reasoned opinion of their refusal; the document I received recently, although censored, contained the rebuttal of the Hungarian government’s objections about the decision of the Euratom Supply Agency denying the original Russian-Hungarian contract. You can read it here: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/index.cfm?fuseaction=list&n=10&adv=0&coteId=3&year=2015&number=1398

I have written the responsible Minister asking if the renewed agreement includes a clause on the shipment after he had viewed the contracts in late July. The minister refused to answer the question referring to the confidentiality of the information despite the fact that this measure is set out in the international agreement on nuclear cooperation ratified as a law, and furthermore despite this being public domain in the previous version.

Yet two further elements point towards the deletion of the automaticity clause.

Firstly, The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is written in a way that makes the HU storage most probable when exploring the possibilities for interim storage of spent fuel.  However, the current storage capacity is inadequate for this purpose. Paks2 or the government will have to build a new one with all its financial and environmental consequences.  Furthermore, Greenpeace has highlighted the potential dangers of the planned location of the interim storage as outlined in the EAI.

Secondly, Attila Aszódi (the responsible government official on the expansion project) said recently that the question of transportation to Russia is still open.

Reconsidering EU-Russia energy relations: a basis for a new balance

The aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian military intervention and the undeclared war in eastern Ukraine brought about a crucial change in the EU’s foreign affairs. The new understanding of a conflict-oriented and imperial rationality-based attitude of the Russian leadership caused a substantial shift in the EU’s Russia-politics – and raises security questions not only at European level but also on the global scale.

The military conflict in Ukraine has brought to the forefront the issue of energy security and the need to reduce all forms of energy dependency from Russia. Underlining this is importance of the EU speaking with one voice in energy policy as well as in its foreign policy.

Russia is the EU’s biggest neighbour and its third biggest trading partner. In the last decade, EU-Russia relations have been characterised by mutual recognition and increasing cooperation, which was evident not only in the fields of trade and economic cooperation. The so-called common spaces cover aspects such as research, culture, education, environment, freedom and justice. Moreover, negotiations have been ongoing since 2008 to further strengthen the partnership and have legally binding commitments in all areas including political dialogue, freedom, security and justice, research, culture, investment and energy. After 2010, the partnership for modernisation has become the focal point for cooperation, reinforcing dialogue initiated in the context of the common spaces.

Not acceptable in any sense

The role of Russia in the Ukrainian crisis shed light on the fact that Russia is not on track in the process of democratisation and modernisation in the way the EU had believed. Russian politics did not become more moderate through the cooperation with the EU, but rather the opposite occurred. Even if we accept the experts’ argumentation for the need for a ‘buffer zone’ between the EU and Russia, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the continuous destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine including aggression by Russian armed forces on Ukrainian soil cannot be considered acceptable in any sense. These issues give a clear indication of the unchanged aggressive nature of Russian politics and leadership. It became clear that Putin is primarily led by imperial rationality and now it seems that Putin’s Russia is no longer interested in a trustworthy and functional relationship with the EU.

Since 2014, the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures in response to the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. After a series of rocket attacks in Mariupol by pro-Russian separatists in January this year, the Latvian EU presidency has called on a council of EU foreign ministers to prepare the ground for a summit of EU leaders on the crisis with Russia and to determine the role the EU should take. The developments over the past two years call for a new interpretation of the Russian-EU relationship as they demonstrate that Putin’s Russia is impossible to handle with peaceful approaches and methods based on seeking consensus. It is all the more important that the EU speaks with one voice and acts in a united manner. And this is exactly what is missing.

A need for clear signals

Some EU member states including Poland and the Baltic states regularly use strong anti-Russian rhetoric, while others, such as Hungary, take political decisions showing an opening towards Russia. These seemingly contradictory attitudes, however, might stem from a common fear of growing Russian influence – partly due to historical reasons. The only difference lies in the role these national governments attribute to the EU (or the US) in handling the conflict, depending on the extent they believe that the EU is willing and able to send clear signals to Russia.

Germany itself, having a huge influence on EU politics, has recently re-evaluated the Russian relationship. Before, Germany had the standpoint that a close economic cooperation could have a stabilising effect on Russia and reduce the possibility of aggressive geopolitical measures. They hoped that this cooperation might also further the modernisation of the Russian economy and thus it might contribute to the creation of a Russian state that was linked to the world economy not only through its energy export, but with many other ties and which has its interests in sustaining the balance of international relationships. Germany, however, has realised that these presuppositions and hopes were wrong. Therefore, Chancellor Merkel placed harsh measures and defends consistently the sanctions that the EU adopted in response to Russia’s military intervention in the Ukraine.

The sanctions in place include the suspension of most cooperation programmes, suspended talks on visas and the new EU-Russia agreement, as well as restrictive measures targeting sectorial cooperation in the fields of defence and sensitive technologies, including those in the energy sector. Russian access to capital markets is also restricted. The European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have suspended the signing of new financing operations in Russia and a trade and investment ban is in force for the Crimea region.

The sanctions would have expired in the course of this year, yet various EU leaders stressed that the EU should maintain the sanctions until Russia stopped the aggression in Ukraine. Thus, the Council meeting of June 2015 extended the restrictive measures and economic sanctions until June 2016. These sanctions, however, are somewhat questionable in their effect.

Thus, the EU has to find a way to ensure aid and protection for the civilian population in eastern Ukraine as well as to find a new balance in the EU-Russian relations.  In this respect, again, speaking with one voice is essential. Finding a new balance is key in the broader context, for the sake of a global equilibrium as well, as Russia might opt for building stronger links to China.

Extreme dependency

These recent developments also affect the issue of energy security in the EU, which is very high on the political agenda now. However, the impacts of Russia’s nuclear investments in the EU are not seriously considered.

We are all aware that the EU is extremely dependent on external energy sources, mainly coming from Russia. (And vice versa, supplies of oil and gas make up a large proportion of Russia’s exports to Europe, which are crucial for the Russian economy. The recent collapse of the Russian economy due to the rapid fall of oil prices is a clear proof of this, as it has shown that the country’s self-confidence merely stemmed from high oil prices.)

The dependency on Russian fossil fuels and the lack of diversification of energy sources have been widely recognised in the EU’s energy policy. However, these are only a small part of the whole picture. The impacts of Russia’s fossil or nuclear investments in the EU are hardly considered in the energy-related acquis, even though it is obvious that through its energy corporations, the Russian government has means of influence far beyond the mere business transactions.

Energy dependency can appear in multiple forms including financial, technological or fuel dependence in the nuclear and fossil sectors, acquisition and ownership of strategic energy infrastructure as well as investments in energy projects by Russia in the EU, in particular, the Baltic and the Central-Eastern European member states. Here again, we see no unified behaviour from EU member states. Some EU member states have reconsidered their cooperation with Russia, or Rosatom in particular, as a consequence of the crisis in Ukraine. For example: Germany refusing to sell gas storage capacities to Russia; Bulgaria refusing a second Rosatom nuclear plant; Slovakia stopping negotiations with the Russian nuclear complex; and the UK suspending its negotiations with the company. At the same time, some EU countries such as Finland or Hungary still consider building new nuclear power plants partly using Russian financial sources, technology, fuel and waste management facilities. It is the responsibility of the EU bodies to ensure that decisions in any member state do not undermine the energy security of the EU as a whole.

Equally importantly, the EU should think out of the box and look beyond resource route diversification and new infrastructure projects, when it comes to improving energy security. A systemic, long term solution for the problem is increased energy efficiency with special attention to the transport sector, residential buildings and industrial sites and the wide-scale use of local, renewable energy sources building upon, inter alia, novel financial solutions and community-based models. Energy efficiency and renewables projects could be very useful components of this project, as they could contribute to reducing all forms of energy dependencies.

To conclude: even if the hopes of the EU for the stabilisation and democratization of Russia have failed to come true, geopolitical realities are given. The EU has to reassess its relationship with Russia, to act firmly in a united manner and to tackle security threats at all levels, including in the field of energy policy. The EU should work for a healthier relationship with Russia in this regard, as well, by systemically reducing its dependency, wherever possible – yet acknowledging long-term mutual dependencies which can be used as a basis for the new balance.

(An earlier version of this article was published on the website of the Green European Journal in February 2015.)

Paks leaked documents

So far, the Hungarian government has even testified in court that they do not publish the feasibility studies of Paks because they do not exist.

The other day got me on the basis of some documents, however, safe to say: there are feasibility studies, but they are not inadvertently kept secret. It becomes clear because of them, that these studies partially a low level or not covered are basic questions that also contain, in turn, based on Paks2 will be catastrophic in both the domestic electricity system, Paks1 profitability and the Danube heat finances.

You can download the documents from here.

paks notes1 – integration

paks notes2 – water cooling

paks notes3 – recommendations

Shale gas extraction becomes cheaper in Hungary

Today in Parliament the Hungarian government, with a majority, made an amendment in the law, reducing the drilling fee of shale gas drilling from 12% to 2%, which is more than puzzling, since despite the huge amount of Hungary’s resources, shale gas is hard to access in the country: in order to extract shale gas, the drilling has to go deeper, the use of chemical substances has to be increased, and the drilling will take place on densely populated areas. In addition, due to the demand for technology and capital, extraction is made possible for foreign companies only, whereas the Hungarian state could have only made profit through an increased drilling fee. Such a law will entail a greater risk for negative environmental consequences, the cost of which will be paid by the country and its citizens.

 

The shipment of the damaged fuel assemblies violated directive 2011/70/Euratom

According to Dialogue for Hungary the shipment to the Russian Federation of the damaged fuel assemblies of the 2003 Paks incident violated the 2011 EU directive on the exportation of nuclear waste.
 
According to Benedek Jávor, member of the party and the European Parliament, the contract including the specifics of the shipment is legally questionable. The damaged assemblies were shipped last year through Ukraine, which meant taking serious safety risks. In addition, as it turned out, the shipment contract also pertained to the final disposal of nuclear waste.
 
Following his inquiry to the Euratom Supply Agency, Mr. Jávor was informed that despite the Hungarian government’s lack of effort to inform the ESA, the original contract of 2010 was amended in 2013. According to ESA, however, the Agency’s signature, “when required, is a necessary condition” for the validity of the contract. Following these developments, Mr. Jávor will now turn to the European Commission with the concern that the Hungarian government might have conducted the shipment of damaged fuel assemblies on the basis of a legally dubious contract.
 

ESA response to Benedek Javor (click here).

20th April 2015

 

 

Paks hearing summary

Given the recent developments in the Paks-case, the hearing on the planned nuclear power plants at Paks – jointly hosted by Benedek Jávor and Rebecca Harms – was given a special emphasis.

Ms. Harms started by reminding the audience that just as we have passed the fourth anniversary of the Fukushima accident, we are nearing to the 29th of the Chernobyl disaster. She also expressed her concern over the incident at the Paks power plant in 2003 and enlisted some of the serious risks of the aftermath of the incident, such as the shipment of hazardous waste via the conflict-heavy Ukraine. In her introduction she urged the European Commission to respond.

In his opening speech, Mr. Benedek Jávor started by recalling that the EURATOM Supply Agency has just recently taken a negative decision on the fuel supply contract. Mr. Jávor warned that since the Hungarian Government has not engaged in a proper dialogue with the EU institutions, including EURATOM, now it has to restart negotiations; therefore, the Russian partner’s involvement in the project might easily become uncertain due to the conditions on fuel supply diversification. Meanwhile, during his visit to Budapest, President Vladimir Putin made no secret of his commitment to carry out the project despite the changed economic conditions. Mr. Jávor emphasized that beyond the obvious environmental dangers, there are serious political and economic risks that cannot be properly assessed due to the lack of public debate and the classification of all the relevant documents. He also reminded that in the context of the debate on European Energy Security Strategy so far, gas supply has been in the centre of attention while nuclear investments carry the same risks despite the multiple forms of dependence it creates. The dependence is not only financial and technological, but also on the fuel cycle.

Ámon Ada Paks konferenciaMs. Ada Ámon, director of Energiaklub, explained that the problem with Paks2 is Paks2 itself. Today the 4 block at Paks have a generation capacity of 2000 MWs. This would be more than doubled by the new nuclear power plant to 4400 MWs. The cost of the total investment, she continued, is 12.5 billion Euros, which is 20% of the Hungarian yearly budget with 10 billion coming from the Russians, the rest from state budget. This will lead to a substantial increase in energy production in Hungary, which, given the long term trends in energy consumption, would barely leave any room for other types of energy on the national market. From among the problems raised by the project, Ms. Ámon emphasized the lack of transparency and public debate, which highly increases the likeliness of corruption. Furthermore, we are facing a case of potential illegal state aid, the exclusion of experts from the decision making process, the lack of an alternative energy-scenario, and the centralization of the country’s energy supplies. All the above mentioned go against EU objectives. She also emphasized the lack of tendering, calling it the sign of the government’s indifference towards market efficiency. In addition, there is a persistent threat of increasing national debt by 5-8%. According to Ms. Ámon Paks2 will never be built, because it does not serve either interest of the Hungarian public or the European Union.

Stephen Thomas Paks ConferenceProfessor Stephen Thomas from the University of Greenwich presented a comparison of the British Hinkley Point C and the Paks power plants. Beyond the many similarities, including the lack of tendering and the probability that tax-payers will suffer the consequences if the plan goes wrong, there is a difference in the ability to withdraw from carrying out the project: while in the UK this possibility can still be considered, the situation in Hungary is not so straightforward. Another difference lies between the economic situations of the two countries: Hungary is much more prone to go bankrupt after building two new power plants, whereas the UK would most likely not suffer such harsh consequences. The risks are also higher in the case of Paks, because there is a possibility that the new power plants will not yet be operational by 2026, the year when the government will have to start paying back the loan. In addition, the question of the inclusion of the overnight costs in the price also differs in the two cases: these costs are clearly included in the prices of the Hinkley Point power plants; as to Paks, the status of the cited price is not obvious. An important similarity, though, is the classification of data, hence the lack of public discourse. There is also quite a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the affordability of the Paks plants: the Russians, said Mr. Stephenson, cannot even afford plants in their own country; it is highly questionable, therefore, how they would be able to pull through with the Paks investment.

Tóth István János Paks ConferenceDr. Todor Galev, researcher at the Center for the Study of Democracy in Bulgaria, explains how the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis have had a major impact on dealing with the question of energy dependency. Mr. Galev expressed his concerns over how Bulgarian politics are penetrated by Russian influence, meanwhile suspicions circulate that certain Bulgarian political parties are financed by Russia. He urged measures to be taken in connection with the formation of a regional cooperation, saying that without such a joint action, no country can protect itself from Russian influence.

Dr. István János Tóth, researcher at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Corruption Research Centre in Budapest, described the nature of corruption within Hungary’s energy sector, where the lack of transparency is more typical than in any other sector. With regard to the Paks2 project, he described the so-called “white elephant syndrome”, i.e. the lack of an actual objective, where corruption itself is the goal. Based on statistical evidence, he said that the Paks2 project will be loss-making. He presented a comparison of 75 projects carried out between the years of 1966 and 1977, which pointed out that the price of nuclear power plant investments were the double or even the triple of their original price in addition to the fact that the time of their construction also typically expanded.

Massimo Garribba Paks ConferenceOn behalf of the European Commission, Mr. Massimo Garribba from DG Energy emphasized two major elements in connection with EU regulations since the Fukushima accident: firstly, the so-called stress tests and secondly the improvement of the legislative framework. He reminded, however, that nuclear energy is an important element of the EU energy mix. He enlisted the different aspects under the EU’s scrutiny of the project. First, he confirmed that negotiations about the fuel supply contract have restarted. He also confirmed that both DG COMP and DG GROW are instigating the project. In addition, he expressed the Commission’s commitment to reach an increased transparency in nuclear issues and called on the Hungarian government to declassify as many documents as possible.

The question of illegal state aid recurred during the question panel as well. Professor Thomas explained that at this stage there is no way of knowing whether there is state aid involved, because the documents are made secret; however, he said, it is clear that public money is involved, since the company responsible for carrying out the project is itself state-owned. His stance was seconded by Mr. Garribba, who said that some clarifications are required in order to know more. The debate on this issue tied in with, Mr. Garribba’s stance that the Commission aims towards requesting as much transparency as possible.

The topic of the lack of a public debate over the Paks decisions was given a twist as Dr. Attila Aszódi, responsible government official for the construction of the new Paks power plants, gave his remarks on the issues discussed at the hearing. He began by expressing his disappointment that no one from the Hungarian authorities had been invited to tell their side of the story. Mr. Jávor later responded to this remark saying he had no intention of creating an inconvenient situation in which a governmental official was asked questions he is legally bound not to answer, as the documents on Paks2 are classified. However, he expressed his appreciation for Mr. Aszódi’s participation in the hearing, saying this way at least a debate can finally evolve.

Mr. Aszódi also explained that one third of Hungary’s electricity is imported and it mainly consists of coal-based technologies. “We strongly believe that this isn’t sustainable,” he said, “we need energy sources not relying on coal.” 40% of Hungary’s electricity should come form from nuclear energy in the long run according to the energy mix chosen for long term by the Hungarian government, he explained. He also pointed out that the country would be much more able to use green energy if it had high mountains, like the Alps; however, Hungary is flatland and as such, its energy policy is determined by limited possibilities.

In response to Mr. Tóth’s presentation and other remarks on non-transparency, Mr. Aszódi rejected claims that the Paks project was in any way corrupt, as corruption, he said, is a crime. He urged the speakers to initiate a legal procedure if they suspected corruption. He also warned Mr. Tóth not to mix the concept of corruption risk with nuclear safety. He stated that the 12,5 billion euros is the total cost of the project with all inflation and other risks included.

Mr. Jávor provided Mr. Aszódi with the conclusions of a recent study that found that there had not been any investigations initiated on corruption cases by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in the last 5 years. He also called Mr. Aszódi’s attention to the fact that there were a number of occasions when he filed reports on corruption with documents and evidence to the public prosecutor, however, without any effect. He also mentioned, that the total cost cannot be 12,5 billion euros, because the interest is around 11 billion to begin with, so the total cost (overnight+capital costs together) of the project should be over 20 billion euros.

Ms. Harms also reacted to Mr. Aszódi’s comments telling about her visit to Paks in 2013, when her aim was to find out more about the project; however, as she said referring to the problem of secrecy and non-transparency, during her visit she found out more about the gardening around the plants than the actual project itself. Should she be invited to Paks this time to have a more elaborate view, she would be more than happy to come, she said.

Paks Hearing

The recording of the event is available. (Click here). Photos are also available here.

Programme:

Welcome by co-hosts
Rebecca Harms, Benedek Jávor

Energy security, Energy policy implications of a large nuclear investment within the EU, with special regard to energy security
Ada Ámon
, President, Energiaklub (Hungary)
For Ada Ámon’s presentation click here

Stephen Thomas, Professor for Energy Policy, Greenwich University (UK)
Stephen Thomas’s presentation

Political security – Risks of Russian dependence of a member state
Dr. Todor Galev
, senior research fellow Center for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria)
Dr Todor Galev’s presentation

Nuclear safety – How the abuse of rules and the presence of corruption poses a threat to nuclear safety
István János Tóth
, Corruption Research Centre and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Tóth István János’s presentation

The European Commission’s assessment of the situation
Massimo Garribba, Director, DG ENERGY, European Commission

Discussion, Q/A

Closing remarks from the co-hosts.

 

Europe is unprepared for Fukushima-level accident (NTW press release)

Brussels, 11 March 2015 –The Fukushima nuclear disaster began four years ago. Although it was initiated by the great earthquake of East Japan and the tsunami that followed, responsible institutions have failed in recognizing the real risks of the reactors, in implementing appropriate nuclear safety standards and, ultimately, in protecting people. Has Europe taken into account all lessons to be learned from the Fukushima catastrophe? An upcoming NTW report identifies key challenges from the civil society point of view.

4th anniversary of Fukushima – has Europe learned anything?  NTW says no. Emergency preparedness is mostly based on an INES 5 nuclear accident and response plans generally cannot cope with an INES 7 accident, the level of the Chernobyl and Fukushima catastrophes. NTW notes that many regional and local authorities are not really prepared for a nuclear accident. In some cases, it seems that EP&R plans have been drafted a long time ago with poor updating regarding important recent spatial changes (new residential neighbourhoods, shopping malls, medical centres, schools, roads, etc.) and without taking into consideration recent changes in technology (internet, mobile phones, new social media, etc.). NTW notices that even during exercises, the communication and notification lines of the responsible institutions are not entirely working as necessary: contact data are sometimes wrong or out-dated, there is a lack of communication between different concerned administration services and warning messages are sometimes no clear or too late.

The heterogeneity of measures in different countries (like the distribution of iodine tablets, evacuation perimeters and zoning) is a crucial transboundary dimension. This heterogeneity is potentially a source of chaos, loss of credibility and, most importantly, of potential failure to protect the population. “European institutions are now debating a new directive on the radioactive contamination of food and feedstuff after an accident to harmonize norms. The chaos we saw in this respect in the EU after Fukushima should indeed never be repeated. But while safety agencies recognize that an accident can happen in Europe, accepting contamination norms that are twice the one of Fukushima is from public health perspective unacceptable”, said Michèle Rivasi, chair of NTW.

NTW’s assessment makes obvious that the usual top-down approach doesn’t work. This approach, which has been used to date in EP&R, should be changed and should involved local communities and interested civil society organisations to take an action to improve the situation. “EP&R provisions today are resulting from closed door discussions. Citizens and citizens’ organisations should be the principal partners in EP&R since they are the ones who are affected in a nuclear event. We need to encourage sharing of information among people and institutions, and to involve the local population in the development of better provisions and systematic transboundary arrangements”, said Nadja Železnik, chair of WG EP&R from NTW.

NTW urges the European Parliament, the European Commission, national governments, regional bodies and municipalities, together with nuclear operators, to provide access to relevant information and to support participation of interested citizens, citizens’ initiatives and civil society organisations in emergency preparedness and response planning, regardless of their general position on the commercial use of nuclear power.

The report will be published in April 2015 during a presentation in the European Parliament. Please find enclosed its executive summary: NTWexecutiveSummaryEP&R