JÁVORT Az EU-BA!

Támogasd Te is küzdelmünket a zöld és igazságos jövőért!

Conference on the accountability of the EU

 

On the 14th of January, Mr. Benedek Jávor took part in a conference at the College of Europe in Bruge, Belgium, where along with Carl Dolan, director of Transparency International EU and Fergal O’Regal, representetaive the Head of Unit at the European Ombudsman, he held a presentation on the transparency and accountability of the European Union as well as the EU’s efforts to tackle corruption. The presentation can be found on this link.

Reconsidering EU-Russia energy relations: a basis for a new balance

The aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian military intervention and the undeclared war in eastern Ukraine brought about a crucial change in the EU’s foreign affairs. The new understanding of a conflict-oriented and imperial rationality-based attitude of the Russian leadership caused a substantial shift in the EU’s Russia-politics – and raises security questions not only at European level but also on the global scale.

The military conflict in Ukraine has brought to the forefront the issue of energy security and the need to reduce all forms of energy dependency from Russia. Underlining this is importance of the EU speaking with one voice in energy policy as well as in its foreign policy.

Russia is the EU’s biggest neighbour and its third biggest trading partner. In the last decade, EU-Russia relations have been characterised by mutual recognition and increasing cooperation, which was evident not only in the fields of trade and economic cooperation. The so-called common spaces cover aspects such as research, culture, education, environment, freedom and justice. Moreover, negotiations have been ongoing since 2008 to further strengthen the partnership and have legally binding commitments in all areas including political dialogue, freedom, security and justice, research, culture, investment and energy. After 2010, the partnership for modernisation has become the focal point for cooperation, reinforcing dialogue initiated in the context of the common spaces.

Not acceptable in any sense

The role of Russia in the Ukrainian crisis shed light on the fact that Russia is not on track in the process of democratisation and modernisation in the way the EU had believed. Russian politics did not become more moderate through the cooperation with the EU, but rather the opposite occurred. Even if we accept the experts’ argumentation for the need for a ‘buffer zone’ between the EU and Russia, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the continuous destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine including aggression by Russian armed forces on Ukrainian soil cannot be considered acceptable in any sense. These issues give a clear indication of the unchanged aggressive nature of Russian politics and leadership. It became clear that Putin is primarily led by imperial rationality and now it seems that Putin’s Russia is no longer interested in a trustworthy and functional relationship with the EU.

Since 2014, the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures in response to the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. After a series of rocket attacks in Mariupol by pro-Russian separatists in January this year, the Latvian EU presidency has called on a council of EU foreign ministers to prepare the ground for a summit of EU leaders on the crisis with Russia and to determine the role the EU should take. The developments over the past two years call for a new interpretation of the Russian-EU relationship as they demonstrate that Putin’s Russia is impossible to handle with peaceful approaches and methods based on seeking consensus. It is all the more important that the EU speaks with one voice and acts in a united manner. And this is exactly what is missing.

A need for clear signals

Some EU member states including Poland and the Baltic states regularly use strong anti-Russian rhetoric, while others, such as Hungary, take political decisions showing an opening towards Russia. These seemingly contradictory attitudes, however, might stem from a common fear of growing Russian influence – partly due to historical reasons. The only difference lies in the role these national governments attribute to the EU (or the US) in handling the conflict, depending on the extent they believe that the EU is willing and able to send clear signals to Russia.

Germany itself, having a huge influence on EU politics, has recently re-evaluated the Russian relationship. Before, Germany had the standpoint that a close economic cooperation could have a stabilising effect on Russia and reduce the possibility of aggressive geopolitical measures. They hoped that this cooperation might also further the modernisation of the Russian economy and thus it might contribute to the creation of a Russian state that was linked to the world economy not only through its energy export, but with many other ties and which has its interests in sustaining the balance of international relationships. Germany, however, has realised that these presuppositions and hopes were wrong. Therefore, Chancellor Merkel placed harsh measures and defends consistently the sanctions that the EU adopted in response to Russia’s military intervention in the Ukraine.

The sanctions in place include the suspension of most cooperation programmes, suspended talks on visas and the new EU-Russia agreement, as well as restrictive measures targeting sectorial cooperation in the fields of defence and sensitive technologies, including those in the energy sector. Russian access to capital markets is also restricted. The European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have suspended the signing of new financing operations in Russia and a trade and investment ban is in force for the Crimea region.

The sanctions would have expired in the course of this year, yet various EU leaders stressed that the EU should maintain the sanctions until Russia stopped the aggression in Ukraine. Thus, the Council meeting of June 2015 extended the restrictive measures and economic sanctions until June 2016. These sanctions, however, are somewhat questionable in their effect.

Thus, the EU has to find a way to ensure aid and protection for the civilian population in eastern Ukraine as well as to find a new balance in the EU-Russian relations.  In this respect, again, speaking with one voice is essential. Finding a new balance is key in the broader context, for the sake of a global equilibrium as well, as Russia might opt for building stronger links to China.

Extreme dependency

These recent developments also affect the issue of energy security in the EU, which is very high on the political agenda now. However, the impacts of Russia’s nuclear investments in the EU are not seriously considered.

We are all aware that the EU is extremely dependent on external energy sources, mainly coming from Russia. (And vice versa, supplies of oil and gas make up a large proportion of Russia’s exports to Europe, which are crucial for the Russian economy. The recent collapse of the Russian economy due to the rapid fall of oil prices is a clear proof of this, as it has shown that the country’s self-confidence merely stemmed from high oil prices.)

The dependency on Russian fossil fuels and the lack of diversification of energy sources have been widely recognised in the EU’s energy policy. However, these are only a small part of the whole picture. The impacts of Russia’s fossil or nuclear investments in the EU are hardly considered in the energy-related acquis, even though it is obvious that through its energy corporations, the Russian government has means of influence far beyond the mere business transactions.

Energy dependency can appear in multiple forms including financial, technological or fuel dependence in the nuclear and fossil sectors, acquisition and ownership of strategic energy infrastructure as well as investments in energy projects by Russia in the EU, in particular, the Baltic and the Central-Eastern European member states. Here again, we see no unified behaviour from EU member states. Some EU member states have reconsidered their cooperation with Russia, or Rosatom in particular, as a consequence of the crisis in Ukraine. For example: Germany refusing to sell gas storage capacities to Russia; Bulgaria refusing a second Rosatom nuclear plant; Slovakia stopping negotiations with the Russian nuclear complex; and the UK suspending its negotiations with the company. At the same time, some EU countries such as Finland or Hungary still consider building new nuclear power plants partly using Russian financial sources, technology, fuel and waste management facilities. It is the responsibility of the EU bodies to ensure that decisions in any member state do not undermine the energy security of the EU as a whole.

Equally importantly, the EU should think out of the box and look beyond resource route diversification and new infrastructure projects, when it comes to improving energy security. A systemic, long term solution for the problem is increased energy efficiency with special attention to the transport sector, residential buildings and industrial sites and the wide-scale use of local, renewable energy sources building upon, inter alia, novel financial solutions and community-based models. Energy efficiency and renewables projects could be very useful components of this project, as they could contribute to reducing all forms of energy dependencies.

To conclude: even if the hopes of the EU for the stabilisation and democratization of Russia have failed to come true, geopolitical realities are given. The EU has to reassess its relationship with Russia, to act firmly in a united manner and to tackle security threats at all levels, including in the field of energy policy. The EU should work for a healthier relationship with Russia in this regard, as well, by systemically reducing its dependency, wherever possible – yet acknowledging long-term mutual dependencies which can be used as a basis for the new balance.

(An earlier version of this article was published on the website of the Green European Journal in February 2015.)

Hungary: MEPs condemn Orbán’s death penalty statements and migration survey -Press release

The European Parliament asks the European Commission to assess the situation in Hungary and to establish an EU mechanism to monitor democracy, the rule of law and human rights annually across the EU, in a resolution voted on Wednesday. Reinstating the death penalty in Hungary would breach the EU Treaties and Charter of fundamental rights, and the wording of the Hungarian government’s public consultation on migration is “highly misleading, biased and unbalanced”, it says.

In the resolution wrapping up the 19 May plenary debate with Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Commission First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, MEPs condemn Mr Orbán’s repeated statements on the possibility of reinstating the death penalty in Hungary and stress the duty of prime ministers to “lead by example”.

Death penalty would trigger EU Treaty Article 7 sanctions

The death penalty is “incompatible with the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights on which the union is founded”, they stress, adding that any member state reintroducing the death penalty would be “in violation of the Treaties and of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”. They note that a serious breach by a member state would trigger the EU Treaty Article 7 procedure, which could lead to the withdrawal of its voting rights in the Council.

Migration consultation misleading, biased and unbalanced

MEPs also denounce the Hungarian government’s public consultation on migration. Although “public consultation can be an important and valuable tool for governments to develop policies”, “the content and the language used in this particular consultation is “highly misleading, biased, and unbalanced; establishing a biased and direct link between migratory phenomena and security threats”, they say.

Need for better monitoring of democracy and the rule of law

They call on the Commission to “immediately initiate an in-depth monitoring process on the situation of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary and to report back on this matter to the European Parliament and Council before September 2015”.

The Commission is also asked to present a proposal to establish an EU mechanism on democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, as a tool for ensuring compliance with and enforcement of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaties as signed by all member states, MEPs say. They also instruct Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to help elaborate this proposal by drafting a non-binding resolution to be voted by Parliament as a whole by the end of this year.

The resolution was passed by 362 votes to 247, with 88 abstentions.

Background for editors

On 28 April, Mr Orbán made a statement claiming the need for a public debate on the death penalty. Following a phone conversation with him on 30 April, European Parliament President Martin Schulz issued a statement saying that Mr Orbán had assured him that the Hungarian government had no plans to take any steps to reintroduce the death penalty and that the Hungarian government would respect and honour all EU Treaties and legislation. However, on the next day, 1 May, Mr Orbán then reiterated his statements on the issue in a national public radio interview.

The public consultation on migration was launched by the Hungarian government in May.

The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs debated death penalty on 7 May, after Parliament’s Conference of Presidents (President Schulz and political group leaders) had asked the committee to examine the situation in Hungary as a “matter of urgency”.
Procedure:  non-legislative resolution

Whistleblower protection

It is difficult to imagine corruption without the contribution of players who have the ability to abuse resources – mostly public resources – for the purpose of generating a private; only people with some kind of power in their hands are able to act as such. In order to prevent those powerful people from misusing public money we need people to counter them. Today, we cannot talk about a serious anti-corruption policy without meaningful protection for these brave men and women.

Whistleblowers play an important role in a democracy ensuring vital information in the public interest is brought to light. The level of the extent to which legal means and guarantees that serve to protect whistleblowers as well as the level of specially protected reporting channels are shockingly uneven when it comes to the different Member States. In view of the anomalies of different regulations, the weakness of national institutions, and recent atrocities and lawsuits brought against whistleblowers, it is high time that whistleblowers were guaranteed protection minimum across Europe.

The resolution voted by the EP in March on the report on the fight against fraud has demanded the Commission to propose legislation to this end and stop stalling.

Strasbourg, 29th April 2015

Benedek Jávor MEP

Shale gas extraction becomes cheaper in Hungary

Today in Parliament the Hungarian government, with a majority, made an amendment in the law, reducing the drilling fee of shale gas drilling from 12% to 2%, which is more than puzzling, since despite the huge amount of Hungary’s resources, shale gas is hard to access in the country: in order to extract shale gas, the drilling has to go deeper, the use of chemical substances has to be increased, and the drilling will take place on densely populated areas. In addition, due to the demand for technology and capital, extraction is made possible for foreign companies only, whereas the Hungarian state could have only made profit through an increased drilling fee. Such a law will entail a greater risk for negative environmental consequences, the cost of which will be paid by the country and its citizens.

 

Press release from Benedek Jávor about the suspension of EU funds

The Hungarian government now acts as if the European Commission’s decision on the suspension of EU funds was a surprise. There is, however, no reason to be surprised: the documents foreshadowing this recent development have long been made accessible. During this time action could have easily been taken to prevent such a decision; however, the government prefers a deeply corrupt procurement system over saving EU funds. What is more is that the present decision could be followed by many more: besides the operative projects now affected by the decision there are at least half a dozen similar projects that received the same evaluation from the Commission. Without a radical alteration in the system, even planned future projects are in jeopardy. It is high time that Viktor Orbán and János Lázár decided whether it is the funding of oligarchs or the fate of the country that matters more to them.

Last December I wrote in my blog about the documents that had been sent by the respective director general of the European Commission to the European Parliament in connection with the supervision of operative programs using EU development funds. This information involved the assessment of the management of all the operative programs of all EU Member States. As I pointed out in my blog post Hungary was among the worst in all examined areas. These data also showed that the Commission not only criticized the programs, but also deemed the provision of information by the Hungarian authorities unreliable.

It was very clear from all these data that the suspension of funds was about to happen. What was predictable now turned into reality. Now at the end of the fifth year of the Orbán-regime, the government’s communication pointing the finger on former governments when talking about the inherited tender-evaluation system, is completely discredited. This is also because the Hungarian management of EU development funds was completely reorganized by the 1st of January, 2014, in that it was assimilated partly into different departments and partly into the Prime Minister’s office. What also becomes clear from the information I provided in December is that the Commission brings its decision based on data received from annual audit records and from regularly updated continuous monitoring. In the current case the decision was probably based on audit records from 2013 and 2014. There is no doubt about whose responsibility this is. What is more is that the current decision can be followed by others: besides the operative projects now affected by the decision there are at least half a dozen similar projects that received the same evaluation from the Commission – these can also be suspended increasing the amount of money lost. Without a radical alteration in the system, even planned future projects are in jeopardy.

Hungary cannot afford to lose such an amount of funds due to the irregular selection of winning tenders. The current suspension affects 700 billion Forints and, according to estimations, will only become available again after paying a sanction mounting up to about 10% of this amount. If we add the development funds lost after the suspension of the Norwegian funds as a result of the government’s attack on the civil sector, the loss goes up as high as 100 billion Forints. It is high time that Viktor Orbán and János Lázár decided whether it is the funding of oligarchs or the fate of the country that matters more to them.

Brussels-Budapest, April 16, 2015
Benedek Jávor MEP

 

Europe’s most expensive motorway project has failed

Based on suspicions of cartel and overpricing, Brussels has rejected financing what came to be known as Europe’s most expensive motorway, the M4. The project came into the European authorities’ scope of attention after a submission from MEP Benedek Jávor.  This miserable failure could have been prevented had the Hungarian authorities, who were the first to be warned by the EP member of Dialogue for Hungary, started dealing with the issue in time.
 
According to the original plans, the segment of the motorway between Abony and Fegyvernek was to be built for 3.79 billion Forints per kilometre (largely from EU funds) as opposed to the earlier record-keeper, the segment of the M7 motorway, including the viaduct, costing 2.8 billion per kilometre. The current motorway segment is without any extra – nothing would explain such a high price. Benedek Jávor, MEP from Dialogue for Hungary, has already issued questions to the government about the reasons last year; however, neither the Minister for Development, László Némethné, nor Mr. János Lázár, reacting on behalf of the Prime Minsiter, deemed intervention necessary. Back then the only response Mr. Jávor was given was that “the price of bitumen and asphalt has increased by 43% in the last ten years” (which is not true) and that because of the situation of the Hungarian economy, the state can only take loans for a higher price (which is irrelevant in case of road-building project funded by the EU).
 
In the meantime, the costs have been heavily raised from 110 billion to 160 billion, which goes beyond rational explanation even further. As the government was reluctant to initiate an investigation, Dialogue for Hungary turned to OLAF, the anti-fraud agency of the EU, which then forwarded Mr. Jávor’s submission to the responsible director general of the European Commission. Now it seems that the file was not just being tossed around by the EU organizations as even the Commission declared that the calculated expenses are astonishingly and irrationally exaggerated in the project carried out by the largest national road-construction companies (the Colas-Swietelsky consortium, the Közgép-A-Híd couple and Strabag).
 
The EU is reluctant to pay the bills of an investment that is suspected of cartel; thus, the project can only be financed by Hungarian tax-payers. According to Dialogue for Hungary it is sad that the government did not take their earlier remarks seriously in preventing the theft in time, thus causing damages to decent Hungarian tax-payers, worth hundreds of billions of Forints. The opposition party now urges strict investigation, accountability and revision affecting the entire EU investment portfolio: neither European nor Hungarian tax-payers wish to further assist to building up an Orbánesque state based on theft.

 

26 March 2015

Benedek Jávor’s contribution to the debate on the progress on equality between women and men in the EU

According to the 2014 report of the Fundamental Rights Agency one third of women go through some form abuse in the EU; estimations suggest that around 3-400 hundred thousand women and their children live in the hell of domestic abuse in Hungary.

The decision of last Tuesday by the Fidesz-Jobbik coalition in the Hungarian parliament to hamper the directive proposal on the urgent ratification of the Istanbul Convention, signed by MP Zsuzanna Szelényi, gave the issue a tragic undertone. Although my country signed the Convention in the beginning of 2014, its ratification, i.e. actual implementation, was not urgent for the right wing. Among the reasons for hampering the proposal there were many awkward, shameful arguments coming from a representative of the far-right party, such as blaming the Convention for not being specific on abortion when – according to her – it is also a form of domestic abuse. Fidesz remains silent; even the topic itself is clearly embarrassing for the party of blind Komondors. I genuinely hope that my fellow representative, Mrs. Ildikó Pelczné Gáll, a substitute member of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, will be able to more successfully inform and convince her colleagues in the party at home about all the European values that exclude the possibility of rejecting the Convention and remaining silent over the issues on the abuse of women.

Respected Colleagues,

Let us do everything for the ratification of the Istanbul Convention in all Member States, as soon as possible, so that the new possibilities of fighting against the abuse of women can finally be turned into real action.

March 9, 2015
Strasbourg

 

Photo: Christopher Michel (CC)

European Parliament Intergroup on Integrity, transparency, corruption and organised crime is disappointed with the EIB’s new transparency policy

The European Parliament Intergroup on Integrity, transparency, corruption and organised crime (ITCO) is disappointed with the new transparency policy of the European Investment Bank, which is weaker than its original policy. This is particularly worrisome as it happens on the eve of the implementation of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), in which the EIB plays a crucial role.

The intergroup acknowledges that improvements have been made since the first draft of the new transparency policy was published in July. De Jong: ”Contrary to the original proposal, the EIB now admits that Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 on access to documents applies to documents relating to its administrative tasks. Any other solution would have been a clear violation of Art.15 TEU. However, a lot of problematic issues still remain unsolved.”

A serious flaw in the new transparency policy is the vagueness that surrounds the publication of information on EIB projects. Still not all projects have to be published on the website. De Jong: ”It is in the interest of the EIB itself to inform citizens about its projects, since they often have a direct impact on society. Mere summaries do not suffice. Moreover, whenever there are indications that projects do not deliver value for money, or worse, that there have been irregularities, such as fraud, corruption or abuse of the projects for tax evasion, citizens want to have full access to the documents concerned. Cases of maladministration and corruption should not be covered-up, more secrecy is not what people want.”

Elly Schlein, co-president of the Intergroup on ITCO adds: ”it is important that more people have access to information. With the EFSI about to start, the EIB cannot choose for a less transparent policy. People have a right of information concerning all activities of the EIB, including the support to companies operating in the developing countries”.

 The intergroup is committed to address the problems raised by this new policy. De Jong: ”we will certainly address this issue in the context of EFSI, but also as part of the budget discharge of the EIB in the Budgetary Control Committee. Moreover, we shall write a letter to the board of directors of the EIB explaining in detail which articles of the new transparency policy of the EIB have to be amended. We trust that the EIB will not ignore our requests.”

12.03.2015

The bureau of the intergroup on integrity, transparency, corruption and organised crime
Dennis de Jong (co-president)
Elly Schlein (co-president)
Ana Gomes
Monica Macovei
Benedek Jávor
Marian Harkin
Ignazio Corrao
Timothy Kirkhope